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Abstract
This article is motivated by the classical results from Shannon that put the simple and elegant
one-time pad away from practice: key length has to be as large as message length and the same
key could not be used more than once. In particular, we consider encryption algorithm to be
defined relative to specific message distributions in order to trade for unconditional security. Such a
notion named honey encryption (HE) was originally proposed for achieving best possible security for
password based encryption where secrete key may have very small amount of entropy.
Exploring message distributions as in HE indeed helps circumvent the classical restrictions on
secret keys.We give a new and very simple honey encryption scheme satisfying the unconditional
semantic security (for the targeted message distribution) in the standard model (all previous
constructions are in the random oracle model, even for message recovery security only). Our new
construction can be paired with an extremely simple yet “tighter” analysis, while all previous
analyses (even for message recovery security only) were fairly complicated and require stronger
assumptions. We also show a concrete instantiation further enables the secret key to be used for
encrypting multiple messages.
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1 Introduction
The celebrated one-time pad is extremely simple and elegant, while satisfying perfect secrecy
that can be against an even computationally unbounded attacker. It also has two well-known
drawbacks that hinder its practical deployment: (1) the key length has to be as large as the
message size as shown in Shannon’s classical work [23] that perfect secrecy must incur such
a cost; and (2) one key can only be used to encrypt one message. These two main drawbacks
of one time pad have motivated cryptographers to introduce the concept of computational
security, and invented corresponding tools. In particular, pseudo-random generators were
developed to stretch a short key to be longer for the stream cipher, and pseudo-random
functions were introduced to design a symmetric key encryption that can use the same short
key to encrypt multiple messages.
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Despite that encryption schemes based on computational hardness are commonly used
in practice (as one of the greatest achievements of modern (computational) cryptography
in general), various application scenarios exist where information-theoretic models and
arguments still play a dominant or defining role: (i) one wishes to maintain security despite
the use of “weak” keys, such as passwords [16], or short keys in resource constraint devices
such as IoT nodes – the information-theoretic setting is forced upon by the fact that brute-
force attacks on the key space become feasible; (ii) one wishes to maintain long-term or even
everlasting security [8] for encrypted storage of highly confidential contents, such as user
secret keys, passwords, or genomics data – the information theoretic setting is demanded as
the validity of computational assumptions highly depends on existing cryptanalysis techniques
and computing powers and infrastructures, (e.g., the emerging threats of quantum computers).
In this article, we ask whether we can have an information theoretic encryption in the
plain model (without random oracles or extra common random sources) whose secret key
can be used as “conveniently” as that in the computational encryption, i.e., with length at
security parameter, and can be used to encrypt arbitrary number of messages (polynomially
bounded). We consider how to circumvent the well-known obstacles by trading generality
of the encryption for unconditional security, in particular, via the lens of honey encryption
[15, 14], which works on message distributions that are known to the encryption algorithm.
Fooling an unbounded adversary with a short key. There have been interesting progresses
regarding how to achieve information theoretic encryption with a short key. To circumvent
the inherent barrier that perfect secrecy requires each message bit to “burn up” a bit of secret
key during encryption, a thread of research considers to give encryptor more information
about the plaintext (but no more than what is known to the adversary). Or to put it another
way, instead of encrypting arbitrary message, the encryption algorithm only works for specific
types of messages to trade for unconditional security.
It began with Russell and Wang ’s 2002 article on Entropic Security [21], and the follow-
up work of Dodis and Smith [9]. They showed how to sidestep the obstacle of key length,
obtaining (information-theoretic) semantic security guarantees even with small keys, by
assuming that the message comes from a high-entropy distribution. On the positive side,
entropic security circumvents the classical entropy bound on the secret key. This model,
however, still requires the key to be long enough and satisfies µ > n − ℓ, where n is the
message length, and µ, ℓ are the key entropy and message entropy respectively. Such an
entropy requirement (though relaxed than one-time pad) still puts a restriction on the key
length, which is often much larger than O(λ). To achieve best possible security of (weak)
password based encryption facing an offline brute-force attack, Juels and Ristenpart proposed
an interesting concept of honey encryption [15] that further explores the message distribution.
The encryption algorithm there is provided with the details of the message distribution. The
key insight is putting attacker to face all plausible messages after brute-force decryption.
However, they considered only a security notion that prevents the adversary to recover the
whole message, which is arguably insufficient in practice.
For this reason, Jaeger, Ristenpart and Tang (JRT) [14] did an in-depth study of honey
encryption: they first defined a semantic security like notion 1 that requires the ciphertext
to hide all partial information, when message is sampled from the distribution (for example,
password, bio-metric data or secret key); and they demonstrated that a simple hash based
encryption achieves the security assuming the hash is a random oracle (or ideal cipher).
1 It is called targeted distribution semantic security, as the encryption algorithm now is designed relative
to a specific message distribution.
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More importantly, the analysis were done in the information theoretic setting. A par-
ticularly interesting message [14] about honey encryption was that designing an encryption
algorithm for a particular message distribution may help to approach our goals: it seems
possible in this case to have semantic security like notion against even unbounded attackers,
but only requiring a secret key that could be as short as that in the computational setting.
Honey encryption with “semantic security” in the standard model. Relying on random
oracles to establish security is certainly unsatisfying, especially in the information theoretic
setting, as a random oracle can pump out unlimited amount of entropy as an idealized
assumption that could not be instantiated in real-life. An immediate natural question to
consider is whether we can construct honey encryption that satisfies a unconditional semantic
security in the standard model, which was left as an open problem in [15, 14]. Thus this
becomes the first problem for us to tackle in this article.
Our first standard model HE construction is a natural instantiation of the DTE-then-
Encrypt construction from [14, 15]: previously, encrypting algorithm is simply the hash
based encryption using hash as a random function (or even an ideal cipher) to generate a
session key for the message. Now we would like to instantiate the random oracle. Let us first
walk through the high-level intuition of the complicated security analysis from [14] (similar
for [15] even though it was only against a weaker message recovery adversary):
Phase (1) of the security analysis in JRT [14] and JR [15] was to transform from the
security game defining semantic security (for a targeted message distribution) to a game in
which the ciphertext is chosen uniformly, and the secret key is sampled after the adversary
has run. In the new game, one can show that the advantage of any adversary is no larger
than that of an “optimal” adversary who decrypts the ciphertext using all possible keys,
computes the predicate value on the resulting plaintext, and outputs the bit which has the
higher cumulative mass of keys that resulted in this bit. Such a cumulative probability can
be viewed as the total weight of the balls in a bin at the end of a balls-and-bins game.
Phase (2) is the complicated part that was to analyze the maximum load in the non-
uniform bin selection with non-uniform balls. A majorization lemma [4] was applied to
upper-bound the quantity that obtained from uniformly weighted balls (with the same
weights). The latter thus can be simply be derived by bounding the number of balls in the
experiment, for which we can use Chernoff inequality.
Now without the random oracle, the balls-into-bins experiment is no longer valid (at least
not in the normal sense), since “ball throws” become correlated with each other. Furthermore,
the majorization technique also requires independence. To get around the major challenges,
we observe that a direct analysis might be possible without using the majorization techniques,
if we leverage a generalized Chernoff-bound [22] to deal with correlated (to some extent)
random variables that even may not be identically distributed. Such technique may also
be applied to simplify the analysis of the JRT result regarding semantic security [14] and
also the JR result [15] for even message recovery security. Since a generalized Chernoff
bound dealt with q-wise independent random variables, it becomes natural to instantiate the
random oracle with a q-wise independent hash. Moreover, after a careful analysis, we can set
the parameter with just a small q such as the security parameter.
Our second standard model HE construction starts from an entropically secure encryption
(ES). This construction and analysis turn out to be surprisingly simple. There is a seeming
dilemma: what we would like to have is an HE scheme with a key of length at most O(λ),
where λ is the security parameter, as in the computational setting; while entropic security
requires the key entropy (length) no smaller than message length minus message entropy. For
most of the message distributions (say with entropy half of the length), it already requires
the key length to be depending on message length.
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But a closer look reveals the power of one important building block for all existing HE
constructions, distribution transforming encoder (DTE for short). A distribution transforming
encoder takes a message distribution, and encodes it to an almost uniform distribution over
another space S. If S is close to {0, 1}n, the encoded distribution is already close to uniform.
Applying an entropically secure encryption on “encoded message distribution” now offers
opportunities to allow the key entropy to be minimal. Interestingly, it is very easy to see the
security of the DTE-then-ES construction of HE, though previous concrete constructions of
HE were all paired with very complicated analysis. 2
It is also worth noting that we can consider the output of DTE to be a uniform distribution
in our analysis, which only adds negligible error. Since the ES scheme is applied on this
distribution, we can further lessen restrictions on the ES scheme: it only needs to work for
uniform input (with full entropy). In this way, we can achieve an even better security bound
than those previous ones, which was considered to be asymptotically optimal.
Fooling an unbounded adversary again with the same short key. It’s well-known that
in one-time pad (and many related constructions), if the secret key is used to encrypt two
messages, some pattern (e.g., whether two messages are equal) is leaked immediately. Such
vulnerability was widely exploited in practice, and lead to numerous highly impacting attacks
[5, 25]. With the encouragement of HE in circumventing the entropy bound in the information
theoretic setting, we are now more ambitious and would like to ask whether one can further
encrypt multiple messages using the same short key. This becomes our second major question
to address in this article.
Insecurity of ES when reusing a key. Neither previous works on entropic security, nor
honey encryption discussed the key reuse issue. To see whether entropic security is helpful
enabling key reuse, we start with the security notion which generalizes the conventional
semantic security definition. Conventionally, the adversary who sees a ciphertext, tries to
learn a predicate on the corresponding message. Now, adversary seeing a vector of ciphertext,
can infer a predicate bit on the vector of messages (which were sampled independently).
Having this definition in place, (informal) intuition that entropic security does not seem
to be promising enabling the key reuse can be seen as follows: One can view the vector of
messages as one large piece of message. Plugging in the entropy bound from [21, 9], suppose
there are t messages, each with entropy n/2 and length n. The entropy bound would require
length of the key to be no smaller than t · n− t · n/2 = tn/2. Even a secret key with length
n could be at most used twice. Such intuition can be easily generalized to the case that
message entropy to be n− 1 (in which the key could be reused at most µ times, where µ is
the entropy of the key)! To formally prove the impossibility, we establish the lower bound
on the key length if an ES scheme reuses the key for T times. This generalizes the original
lower bound in the single ciphertext setting [21, 9]. An analysis on key length requirements
is given in Sec. 4.1 to show that in order to reuse the key for T times, we must have the key
length at least to be (n− t)T , where the messages are from distribution with entropy t.
2 We remark that, as far as we know, such a simple construction has not been shown before. Previously,
honey encryption was motivated by password based encryption, thus their main goal is to obtain security
with a weak key. Thus comparison focused on the insufficiency of entropic security [15, 14] due to its
key length requirement. When we consider honey encryption from the angle of unbounded security,
entropic security becomes a natural candidate to leverage, which enables us to simplify the analysis for
HE [15, 14] dramatically. We still presented the q-wise independent hash based construction to showcase
(already simplified) existing analysis structure, which in turn demonstrates the simplicity of HE from
entropic security. Ironically, with existing analysis of the q-wise independent hash based construction,
we cannot even choose q to be as small as 2, while entropic security based construction can!
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Honey encryption that allows key re-use in the standard model. The existence of entropy
bounds in both one-time pad and entropic security hints that security in those two settings
needs to burn key entropy for each ciphertext. However, the entropy bounds do not seem to
appear in honey encryption when one encrypts only for a particular message distribution.
We ask whether HE can remain secure when the secret key is reused.
We first remark that, key re-use does not come for free in honey encryption. The above
impossibility in entropic security directly hints this, and also gives an example: the HE
construction instantiating with the small-biased set based ES scheme from [21], does not
allow key reuse, even when the message is uniform. There, the overall construction is basically
in the form of M ⊕ s(K) for a function s() defining the small biased set.
Fortunately, we show, the HE construction from the pairwise independent hash (trivially
holds for the q-wise independent hash based construction as well) allows one to reuse key for
arbitrary number of times t with only a security loss linear to t. We also give a definition
of (targeted distribution) semantic security that allows key reuses. Interestingly, the view
that leads to the entropy deficiency in entropic security explains the intuition why the
second HE construction enables key reuses. As a high level intuition, now facing a vector of
independently sampled messages, encoding them individually and then concatenating works
as a good DTE; hashing them individually and then concatenating also works as a good
pairwise independent hash! Those observations essentially reduce the security of key reuse to
the security of HE on another message distribution.
Now we finally have an information theoretically secure encryption that can have and use
a key as convenient as in the computational setting, just by giving the encryption algorithm
details of the message distribution (which is no more than what the adversary knows).
Discussions. Honey encryption was originally proposed to deal with best possible security
for password based encryption, where a very small amount of entropy in password is available.
We find the underlying concept exploring the message distribution to “mute” the brute-force
attack very inspiring and applicable to broader information theoretic setting, which motivated
us to examine information theoretic encryption via the HE lens and vise versa.
As we demonstrate, exploring message distribution enables us to circumvent the major
obstacle about secret key in information theoretic encryption; on the other hand, putting
HE in the unbounded security domain also leads to a very natural and simple construction
of HE from entropic security, which simplifies our understanding of HE itself. Indeed, all
previous HE constructions (even in the random oracle model and only against a weaker
message recovery adversary) require fairly complicated analysis.
Other related works. There exist several lines of exploration of relaxing information
theoretic security or adding extra setup for smaller key length. One attempt is adding
constraints to the adversary, e.g. restricting adversary’s access to limited ciphertext bits[19],
or constraining adversary’s memory usage (bounded storage model)[6, 3, 8, 11, 18]. These
schemes mostly focus on key expansion by leveraging honest guy’s advantage. In bounded
storage model, for example, a short secret key is expanded to a one-time pad key using
the random sources, and the actual key in use should still satisfy Shannon’s bound. In
comparison, we do not give encryption algorithm any extra knowledge in honey encryption;
what we give to the encryption algorithm (message distribution) is already known to the
attacker. Another relaxed notation proposed by Calmon et al. is ε-symbol secrecy[10], in
which it is hard for an adversary to recover message bits (but not functions of messages).
Limited by underlying encoding scheme, though, the key size cannot be compressed to be
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as small as security parameter. A third way of relaxation is to restrict input messages
to concrete distribution, for example, maximal correlation secrecy[17] requires input to be
uniformly distributed.
We note that, none of the constructions dealt with security when a key is reused, except
that might be possible in the bounded storage model; but, essentially, the random source
generate fresh randomness for each encryption, which implicitly uses a super large key.
Shikata[24] proposed formalization of several information theoretic security definitions
and gave lower bounds of key length, which was later extended to multiple-use model. While
our work restricts the input messages to follow certain distribution, in their work, however, a
key is required to have Ω(mT ) length if it is reused T times, where m denotes the message
length. Therefore, it is clear they cannot have a short key and enable the key reuse.
HE has a number of real-world applications, such as secure password vaults[7, 12],
genomic data[13], and natural languages [20, 1]. Recently, a systematic study about various
pseudorandom encodings including DTE was given in [2].
2 Preliminaries and Honey Encryption Background
Notations. Let S be a set, a distribution on S is defined to be a function p : S → [0, 1]
such that
∑
s∈S p(s) = 1. Denote US to be the uniform distribution on S. For a set B ⊆ S,
define p(B) =
∑
s∈B p(s). By s←pS we mean sampling an element s from S according to
distribution p, and by s←$S we mean s is sampled uniformly from S. Let A be a randomized
algorithm, then by y←$A(X) we mean y is the output of algorithm A running on input
X. We use y ← A(X) if A is a deterministic algorithm instead. For a game G, we use
Pr[G⇒ true] to denote the probability that G outputs true.
Min-entropy. Let X ←pS be a random variable with distribution p. The min-entropy of X
is H∞(X) = − log maxs∈S p(s). We also use notations H∞(p) = H∞(X) for simplicity.
q-wise independent hash functions. A family of hash functions {Hi : M → S}i∈I is
called universal hash family if for all m1, m2 ∈ M, m1 ̸= m2, Pri←I [Hi(m1) = Hi(m2)] ≤
1
|S| . Furthermore, the hash family {Hi} is called q-wise independent if for any distinct
m1, m2, · · · , mq ∈M and any t1, t2, · · · , tq ∈ S,∣∣∣ Pr
i←I
[Hi(m1) = t1 ∧ Hi(m2) = t2 ∧ · · · ∧ Hi(mq) = tq]
∣∣∣ = 1|S|q
{Hi} is also called pairwise independent when q = 2.
Let F be a field. A (polynomial) q-wise independent hash family H(a0,··· ,aq−1) : F → F,






Entropic security. The definition of entropic security was first proposed by Russel and
Wang in [21] and later studied by Dodis and Smith[9]. A probabilistic map Y is said to hide
all functions of X with leakage ε if for every adversary A, there exists some adversary A′
such that for all functions f ,
|Pr[A(Y (X)) = f(X)]− Pr[A′() = f(X)]| ≤ ε








C ←$ HEnc(K, M)
b←$A(C)
return b = f(M)
Figure 1 TDSS Security Games.
The map Y () is called (µ, ε)-entropically secure if Y () hides all functions of X, whenever the
min-entropy of X is at least µ. We say Y () is (µ, ε)-entropically secure for predicates if Y ()
hides all functions of X that take value in {0, 1}.
Honey encryption[15, 14]. A honey encryption (HE) scheme HE = (HEnc, HDec) is designed
for a specific input distribution. We use K, M and C denote the key space, the message
space and the ciphertext space, and pk, pm denote the key distribution on K and the message
distribution on M respectively. The encryption algorithm will take pm as input.
Target distribution semantic security (TDSS) [14]. Since honey encryption is designed
only for each specific message distribution, the semantic security type of definition has to be
adapted for a targeted distribution. For more detailed discussions, we refer to [14].
Let f : M → {0, 1} be a predicate on M, pf (b) = Pr[f(M) = b |M ←pmM ], and
ωf = max{pf (0), pf (1)}. Define security games for HE with respect to distributions pk, pm
in Figure 1: In game TDSS0 an adversary As called a simulator tries to guess the value of
f(M) with no access to ciphertexts, while in game TDSS1 the adversary A guess f(M) given
an encryption of M . The advantage of an adversary A with respect to HE, distributions
pm, pk and predicate f is defined as:








The optimal strategy for As in TDSS0 is to output the most probable value of f(M)




= ωf . Therefore we can rewrite





▶ Definition 1. An HE scheme HE with respect to key distribution pk and message distribution
pm is said to be ε−TDSS secure if
AdvtdssHE,pm,pk = maxA,f Adv
tdss
HE,pm,pk (A, f) ≤ ε
where the max is over all (unbounded) adversary A and arbitrary predicate f .
Distribution-transforming encoder (DTE)[15]. A DTE is a pair of algorithms DTE =
(encode, decode) defined relative to sets M and S, where randomized encoding algorithm
encode takes as input a message M ∈ M and outputs S ∈ S, and deterministic decoding
algorithm decode takes as input S ∈ S and outputs M ∈ M. DTE should always satisfy
correctness: for all M ∈M, Pr[decode(encode(M)) = M ] = 1.
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return b = 1
Figure 2 DTE Security Games.
HEnc(K, M)
S ←$ encode(M)
C ←$ Enc(K, S)
return C
HDec(K, C)






C̃ ← HR(K)⊕ S




S ← HR(K)⊕ C̃
M ← decode(S)
return M
Figure 3 Left: DTE-then-Encrypt; Right: DTE-then-Hash.
The security property for DTE schemes is defined via the security games in Figure 2.









Define DTE advantage as measurement for DTE security as follows:
▶ Definition 2. The DTE advantage of a scheme DTE with respect to distribution pm is defined
to be AdvdteDTE,pm = maxD Adv
dte
DTE,pm(D), where the maximization is over all (unbounded)
adversary D.
Although it is mentioned in [2] that DTE does not exist for all distributions, a large
number of distributions can be encoded using a DTE. For example, a distribution can be
encoded using inverse-sampling DTE in [15] if values of all probability mass functions are
explicitly given.
DTE-then-Encrypt[15, 14]. DTE-then-Encrypt serves as a framework to construct HE
schemes with respect to a target distribution. A message is first encoded using DTE and then
encrypted using a symmetric encryption. The framework is described in Fig 3. In [15, 14], the
encryption is instantiated with a hash-based encryption scheme Enc(K, M) = (R, HR(K)⊕M),
where R is randomly drawn. We rename this DTE-then-Hash for clarity. The DTE-then-Hash
construction is described in Fig 3.
3 HE Constructions Secure in the Standard Model
Recall that for an n-bit input, one-time pad requires the key to have at least n bits of min-
entropy. Entropically secure encryption scheme (ES scheme) relaxes this entropy requirement
to n− t by restricting the input with at least t bits of min-entropy. If the ES scheme uses a
key with min-entropy n− t + δ, it would achieve a security around 2−δ/2[9]. HE completely
removes the key entropy requirement by working on a specific message distribution (called
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target distribution). JRT showed that an HE scheme using a key with min-entropy δ would
achieve ε-TDSS (targeted distribution semantic security) for ε slightly bigger than 2−δ/2 (e.g.
ε is around 2−13 when δ = 30[14]), albeit in random oracle model.
Below we present our two attempts at HE constructions in the standard model as well
as security analysis: the first using q-wise independent hash family, and the second using
an ES scheme. The first construction, which is a natural extension of JR[15] and JRT[14]’s
construction in standard model, gives a security bound comparable to the random oracle case,
and requires q to be around key length. While this is acceptable for low-entropy key settings,
it turns out that our second HE construction using ES scheme can achieve asymptotically
optimal security bounds and only requires a pairwise independent hash family.
3.1 HE from q-wise independent hash
Our first attempt to construct HE in standard model follows from the previous works of [15]
and [14]. Their construction applies DTE-then-Hash framework where the hash function is
modeled as a random oracle. While we cannot use random oracle since we are working in
standard model, it is natural to consider the case where the hash function is modeled as a
q-wise independent hash family instead. As we will see, the overall structure of the analysis
of [15] and [14] still applies with the use of new techniques, yet it results in a relatively weak
bound. We give a high level overview in this section and leave the full proof in the appendix.
Let us recall the TDSS security analysis of DTE-then-Hash construction presented in
[14, 15], which came in two main steps. In the first step, game transitions are performed on
the original TDSS security game to another game where the adversary’s best strategy is to
decrypt the ciphertext using all possible keys, compute the predicate value on all decryptions,
and output the bit which is supported by larger probability mass of keys. Note that such
transition does not rely on random oracle, and incurs an error which is bounded by DTE
advantage. In the second step, different balls-into-bins analysis are applied where each
decryption attempt is considered as throwing a “ball” into a “bin”. Each decryption result is
considered to be independent if random oracle is used; however, we introduce correlations to
the decryption results using q-wise independent hash family, and we cannot use majorization
lemma to simplify the probability analysis. We overcome these problems by using a more
general Chernoff-like bound on q-wise independent random variables[22]. An advantage of
this bound is that it does not require the random variables to have the same distribution, so
that we can even omit the majorization step in previous proofs.
Game transitions. Similar to previous results [14, 15] , the first part of the proof is
summarized by the following lemma from [14], which transforms the estimation of the




in an experiment EH,DTE,fpk defined in 4, via a sequence of games. The bias of the predicate is
ωf = max{pf (0), pf (1)}.





denotes the success probability of this attack. In other words, we are transitioning
to an experiment in which a brute-force attack is performed, and we are concerned with the
success probability of such attack.
▶ Lemma 3 ([14]). Let HE be defined using DTE-then-Hash construction with respect to
distributions pm, pk, q-wise independent hash family {Hi} and DTE scheme DTE, f be a
predicate on M, A be any adversary, then
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Experiment EH,DTE,fpk
R←$ {0, 1}r, C̃ ←$S
B0 ← ∅, B1 ← ∅
for i = 1, 2, · · · , |K| do
Si ← HR(Ki)⊕ C̃
Mi ← decode(Si)
bi ← f(Mi)





Figure 4 Experiment used in security analysis of DTE-then-Hash.
Proof for Lemma 3 is given in Appendix A.





, which represents the probability of a success brute-force attack. This
is the different part of analysis we have to do without the luxury of relying on random oracle
to get independence or majorization technique to simplify the balls-into-bins experiment.
Our main tool is the following more general Chernoff-like result which is a special case of a
theorem from [22]:
▶ Lemma 4 ([22]). Let X1, · · · , Xn be q-wise independent random variables confined to the
interval [0, 1], and X =
∑n
i=1 Xi with µ = E[X], then
1) For δ ≤ 1 satisfying q ≤ ⌊δ2µe−1/3⌋, Pr[|X − µ| ≥ δµ] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋;
2) For δ ≥ 1 satisfying q ≤ ⌊δµe−1/3⌋, Pr[|X − µ| ≥ δµ] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋.
Define pd to be the probability distribution of M given by sampling a uniformly random
seed from S and then applying decode, i.e.
pd(M) = Pr[M∗ = M |S←$S, M∗ ← decode(S) ]




; we defer detailed proof to Appendix B:
▶ Lemma 5. Let pt(b) = Pr[f(M) = b |M ←pdM ] and ωt = max{pt(0), pt(1)}. Let ωk





≤ ωt + e−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6
Finalizing the bound. The following theorem sums up the two steps above and gives a
TDSS security bound:
▶ Theorem 6. Let HE be constructed using DTE-then-Hash with respect to distributions
pm, pk and q-wise independent hash family {Hi}i∈{0,1}r , where ωk denotes the maximum key




−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6
In other words, HE is ε−TDSS secure for
ε = 2AdvdteDTE,pm + e
−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6
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The proof for Lemma 5 and Theorem 6 are given in Appendix B.
Note that if we choose q = log(1/ωk) = H∞(pk) in Theorem 6, the security bound is
asymptotic to O((ωk log(1/ωk))1/2), which is close to O(ω1/2k ) in low min-entropy key settings.
This implies that we can choose q ≈ λ if we are using a key of length λ. However, we cannot
choose q = O(1) because of the results in Lemma 4. Furthermore, although the O(log(1/ωk)))
hardly affects the security bound, we can actually push harder towards the O(ω1/2k ) bound,
which is considered to be optimal in [14].
3.2 HE from entropically secure encryption
We now give an HE construction satisfying TDSS in the standard model via entropic security.
This idea arises when we view both of them as information theoretic encryption candidates.
An observation is that entropic security notion and TDSS notion are similar in some way:
they both capture the hardness for an unbounded adversary to learn any predicate of the
input message given an encryption of this message. The difference is that entropic security
expects entropy from the message, while HE scheme further explores the message distribution.
Intuitively, we would like to “modify” input message to gain enough entropy.
In order to match the entropy requirement in entropic security, we first encode input
messages using DTE (constructed specifically for message distribution, see above definition
in Sec.2). It should be pointed out, however, that DTE actually outputs a near-uniform
distribution which has almost full entropy. We can think of the DTE output as a uniform
distribution in our analysis, which only incurs negligible error. Such ES schemes are easy to
find; in fact, any (n− α, ε)-ES scheme for α ≥ 0 supports uniform input, since it supports
any input with min-entropy at least n− α. In this way, the entropy requirements in the ES
scheme becomes unimportant since we are using uniform distribution as input; We can even
use an ES scheme which only supports uniform input, which leads to better parameters. In
fact, according to an observation in JRT[14], our construction achieves asymptotically best
TDSS security bound O(ω1/2k ).
More interestingly, our analysis is much simpler than that in JRT[14] and even the
message recovery security analysis in JR[15], which is a strictly weaker security notion than
TDSS; while at the same time, this simpler analysis is “tighter”: the entropic security path
gives an instantiation from pairwise-independent hash, but following the more complicated
analysis structure in Sec. 3.1, the resulting bound does not allow us to choose q to be as
small as 2 in the q-wise independent hash based construction.
▶ Theorem 7. Let pm be a distribution on a set M, pk be a distribution on a set K, and n
be an integer. Let e = (EEnc, EDec) be an (n− α, ε)-ES scheme for arbitrary 0 ≤ α < n with
key space K, key distribution pk and message space {0, 1}n, and DTE = (encode, decode) a
DTE scheme with respect to pm that outputs an n-bit binary string. Then the DTE-then-
Encrypt construction using e and DTE is an ε′−TDSS secure HE scheme with respect to key
distribution pk and message distribution pm, where ε′ = ε + AdvdteDTE,pm .
Proof. It is easy to check that the HE construction is well defined and satisfies correctness.
We show that HE satisfies ε−TDSS security. For every adversary A and arbitrary predicate
f , consider the following sequence of games:
Now game G0 is exactly the same as game TDSS1A,fHE,pm,pk . Consider the following
adversary D(S) against DTE security: One can check that D simulates G1 when S←$S and
simulates G0 when S is an encoding of M ←pmM. Furthermore, D returns 1 if and only if
A wins in corresponding games. It follows from DTE advantage definition that
Pr[G0 ⇒ true]− Pr[G1 ⇒ true] ≤ AdvdteDTE,pm (1)
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C ←$ EEnc(K, S)
b←$A(C)
return b = f(M)
Game G1
K ←pk K
S ←$ {0, 1}n
M ← decode(S)
C ←$ EEnc(K, S)
b←$A(C)
return b = f(M)




C ←$ EEnc(K, S)
b←$A(C)
if b = f(M) return 1
else return 0
Figure 6 Adversary D(S) against DTE security.
We now work in game G1. Note that the random variable S is uniformly sampled from
{0, 1}n, therefore S has min-entropy n. By the definition of entropic security, there exists
some adversary A′ such that for all functions f̃ ,∣∣Pr[A(EEnc(K, S)) = f̃(S)]− Pr[A′() = f̃(S)]∣∣ ≤ ε
Setting f̃(S) = f(decode(S)) we get
|Pr[A(EEnc(K, S)) = f(M)]− Pr[A′() = f(M)]| ≤ ε
Now Pr[A(EEnc(K, S)) = f(M)] is exactly the probability that A returns true in game G1,
in other words Pr[A(EEnc(K, S)) = f(M)] = Pr[G1 ⇒ true]. On the other hand, we have




since the simulator As can simply run A′ and
return the same value as A′ does. In other words,∣∣Pr[G1 ⇒ true]− Pr[TDSS0As,fpm ⇒ true]∣∣ ≤ ε (2)
Combining 1 and 2 we have








≤ ε + AdvdteDTE,pm = ε
′
Since this holds for all A and f , we have
AdvtdssHE,pm,pk = maxA,f Adv
tdss
HE,pm,pk (A, f) ≤ ε
′
In other words, HE is ε′−TDSS secure. ◀
As a special case, let e be the random hashing construction in [9]:
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▶ Lemma 8 ([9]). Let {Hi}i∈I be a pairwise independent hash family from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}n,
and K is sampled according to pk, then the encryption scheme Enc(K, M ; i) = (i, Hi(K)⊕M)
is (µ, ε)-entropically secure for µ = n−H∞(pk) + 2 log(1/ε) + 2. Specifically, Enc(K, M ; i)
is (n− δ, ε)-entropically secure for H∞(pk) = δ + 2 log(1/ε) + 2.
In our HE construction we only require the entropically secure encryption scheme to
support uniform distribution, therefore we can choose δ = 0 for optimal parameters. This
leads to the following corollary:
▶ Corollary 9. Let HE with respect to key distribution pk and message distribution pm be
constructed using the DTE-then-Hash construction, in which a pairwise independent hash
family and an DTE scheme with advantage AdvdteDTE,pm are applied. Then HE is ε−TDSS




DTE,pm , where ωk denotes the
maximum key probability.
Corollary 9 shows that we can achieve O(ω1/2k ) TDSS security using a pairwise independent
hash family. Comparing this to Remark 5.6 in JRT[14] which states that TDSS security
is at least at the order of ω1/2k , we conclude that our construction achieves asymptotically
best security bound while only requiring pairwise independent hash. This is an improvement
over JRT[14]’s results, especially since we are working in standard model compared to their
random oracle assumption (and also to JR[15] which only considered a weaker message
recovery attack with RO).
4 Multi-Message Security
In this section, we are concerned with another drawback of information theoretic encryption
besides the key length: the same key must not be used to encrypt multiple messages. Indeed,
using one-time pad to encrypt two messages m1, m2 with the same key k yields two ciphertexts
m1 ⊕ k, m2 ⊕ k, from which one can easily recover the value of m1 ⊕m2. We first analyze
the (in)security of key reuse in entropic security, which also has implication that a honey
encryption which is not carefully designed for key reuse will also be facing attacks when
re-using the same key. Nevertheless, we prove that our HE construction in the standard
model using pairwise independent hash further allows one to re-use a short key: this HE
construction finally addresses both issues.
4.1 Insecurity of key re-use in entropic security
Entropic security leveraging message entropy helps decrease the key length, however, entropy
security does not give a solution to this problem: ES schemes become insecure when a
single key is used to encrypt multiple messages, even if these messages are independently
sampled. Informally speaking, each encryption requires a slice of fresh randomness from
the key, thus the key has to be long enough in order to provide sufficient randomness. We
give an analysis on lower bound of the key needed for reuse: generalizing the analysis from
single-message settings in [9], first we show that entropic security for multiple messages
implies indistinguishability of multiple ciphertexts; then the lower bound can be derived
from a Shannon-style bound (when we choose a special representative message distribution).
This lower bound implies that a secret key in an ES scheme can only be used to encrypt
very limited number of messages.
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Key reuse for independent messages in entropy security. We first give a formal definition
of entropic security in key reuse scenario, where a single key is used to encrypt multiple
independently sampled messages. Note that the security definition becomes stronger if we
remove the independence restriction; since we are after a negative result, it suffices to consider
this weaker variant.
▶ Definition 10. A probabilistic map Y () is called (t, ε, T )-entropically secure if for all
independent random variables X1, · · · , XT where each Xi has min-entropy at least t, and for
all adversary A, there exists some adversary A′ such that for all functions f ,
|Pr[A(Y (X1), · · · , Y (XT )) = f(X1, · · · , XT )]− Pr[A′() = f(X1, · · · , XT )]| ≤ ε
In the first part of the proof, we will show that for a (t, ε, T )-entropically secure encryption
scheme, the joint distribution of T ciphertexts (using the same key) satisfies indistinguishab-
ility definition. The latter basically requires that for any two message distributions with
the same entropy, the ciphertext distribution would be indistinguishable. An alternative
(and equivalent) definition that makes the following easier is that there exists one particular
distribution G (that is irrelevant to the system), for all message distributions, the resulting
ciphertext is indistinguishable with G. We first generalize those definitions to fit our setting
of multiple messages:
▶ Definition 11. A randomized map Y () is (t, ε, T )-indistinguishable, if there is a random
variable G, such that for every independent random variables Xt, · · · , XT over {0, 1}n where
each Xi has min-entropy at least t, we have
SD((Y (X1), · · · , Y (XT )), G) ≤ ε
We prove the following lemma: an entropic secure encryption that can re-use the key for
T times implies a form of indistinguishability.
▶ Lemma 12. (t, ε, T )-entropic security for predicates implies (t− 1, 4Tε, T ) -indistinguish-
ability.
Proof. Let (X1, · · · , XT ) and (X ′1, · · · , X ′T ) be two vectors of random variables where each
Xi is independent from each Xj , each X ′i is independent from each X ′j , and each Xi, X ′i has
min-entropy at least t− 1.
First of all, it suffices to prove the indistinguishability of (X1, · · · , XT ) and (X ′1, · · · , X ′T )
when each Xi and each X ′i is a flat distribution on some set of 2t−1 points. Otherwise we
can rewrite (X1, · · · , XT ) and (X ′1, · · · , X ′T ) as sum of distributions
(X1, · · · , XT ) =
∑
i
ai(Xi1 , · · · , XiT ), (X ′1, · · · , X ′T ) =
∑
j
bj(X ′j1 , · · · , X
′
jT )
where each coordinate Xik , X ′jl is a flat distribution. SD((X1, · · · , XT ), (X
′
1, · · · , X ′T )) can
then be upper bounded by
∑
i,j aibjSD(Xi1 , · · · , XiT ), (X ′j1 , · · · , X
′
jT
). Therefore it suffices




SD((Xi1 , · · · , XiT ), (X ′j1 , · · · , X
′
jT )) ≤ 4Tε.
Now assume (X1, · · · , XT ) and (X ′1, · · · , X ′T ) satisfy that: for each i, Xi and X ′i are two
flat distributions over disjoint sets of 2t−1 points each. Let X̃ = (X̃1, · · · , X̃T ) be sampled
as follows: to sample from X̃i, first sample a random bit bi uniformly; if bi = 0, sample
X̃i according to Xi, and otherwise sample X̃i according to X ′i. In this way, each X̃i has
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min-entropy t, and X̃1, · · · , X̃T are independent from each other. For every i, let fi be the
predicate which outputs 0 if X̃i is sampled according to Xi, and 1 if X̃i is sampled according
to X ′i, regardless of the choices of other coordinates.
For each i, define an adversary Ai which, given inputs y = (Y (X̃1), · · · , Y (X̃T )), outputs
0 if Y (X̃i) is more likely under the distribution Y (Xi) than Y (X ′i), and 1 otherwise. Note
that the output of Ai is independent of the choices of X̃1, · · · , X̃i−1, X̃i+1, · · · , X̃T . Therefore
the probability that Ai successfully predicts fi is
Pr
[




2SD(Y (Xi), Y (X
′
i))
On the other hand, for any random variable G over {0, 1} independent of X̃i, the probability
that G = fi(X̃1, · · · , X̃T ) is exactly 12 . By (t, ε, T )-entropic security we get
Pr
[






G = fi(X̃1, · · · , X̃T )
]
+ε = 12 +ε
From two inequalities above we get SD((Y (Xi), Y (X ′i))) ≤ 2ε for every i ∈ [1, T ]. Therefore,
SD((Y (X1), · · · , Y (XT )), (Y (X ′1), · · · , Y (X ′T ))) ≤
T∑
i=1
SD((Y (Xi), Y (X ′i))) ≤ 2Tε
For the case where Xi and X ′i are not disjoint, we can find a third vector (X ′′1 , · · · , X ′′T )
where each X ′′i is a flat distribution on 2t−1 points disjoint from both Xi and X ′i. In this
way,
SD((Y (X1), · · · , Y (XT )), (Y (X ′′1 ), · · · , Y (X ′′T ))) ≤ 2Tε
SD((Y (X ′1), · · · , Y (X ′T )), (Y (X ′′1 ), · · · , Y (X ′′T ))) ≤ 2Tε
We then use the triangle inequality to show that
SD((Y (X1), · · · , Y (XT )), (Y (X ′1), · · · , Y (X ′T ))) ≤ 4Tε ◀
The indistinguishability result can be used to bound the key size: essentially, we will
choose a special distribution of vector such that each coordinate has a fixed prefix wi, while
the remaining parts are sampled uniformly. ES ciphertexts can be seen as a statistically
secure encryption scheme with all the wi as input, which gives us the desired bound.
▶ Lemma 13. Any encryption scheme which is (t, ε, T )-entropically secure for inputs of
length n requires a key of length at least (n− t + 1)T − 1.
Proof. For every w = (w1, · · · , wT ) ∈ {0, 1}(n−t+1)T , where each wi ∈ {0, 1}n−t+1, let Mwi
be uniformly chosen from {wi} × {0, 1}t−1 and Mw = (Mw1 , · · · , MwT ). Then each Mwi
has min-entropy t− 1, and any (t, ε, T )-entropically secure encryption scheme Enc produces
indistinguishable distributions (Enc(Mw1), · · · , Enc(MwT )), and (Enc(Mw′1), · · · , Enc(Mw′T ))
for any pair (w, w′). Therefore (Enc(Mw1), · · · , Enc(MwT )) can be seen as an encryption
scheme for (n− t + 1)T -bit strings, and thus Enc must have key length (n− t + 1)T − 1. ◀
▶ Remark 14. Lemma 13 implies that in an ES scheme, a key of length µ can only be used to
encrypt O(µ) messages even if these messages have entropy n−O(1). Therefore one cannot
expect ES to remain secure in multi-message settings, especially with the use of a short key.
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5 Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we investigate the following problem: is it possible to have an encryption
scheme (for a class of messages) that satisfies unbounded semantic type of security, but
using only a short key and the key can be re-used. We give an affirmative answer with a
construction of honey encryption from pair-wise independent hash that satisfies both.
Approaching the problem via the lens of honey encryption inspires us to explore a nice
trade-off between security and generality. We hope our initial positive results can motivate
more researches on exploring message distribution for better information theoretic encryption:
more general encoding mechanisms, relaxing message independence requirement in key reuse,
considering integrity and more.
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A Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. We use the sequence of games in Figure 7:
Game G0
1 : K ←pk K
2 : M ←pmM
3 : S ←$ encode(M)
4 : R←$ {0, 1}r
5 : C̃ ← HR(K)⊕ S
6 : C ← (R, C̃)
7 : b←$A(C)






C̃ ← HR(K)⊕ S
C ← (R, C̃)
b←$A(C)




C ← (R, C̃)
b←$A(C)
K ←pk K
S ← HR(K)⊕ C̃
M ← decode(S)
return b = f(M)
Figure 7 Sequence of games used in Lemma 3.
First of all, game G0 is exactly game TDSS1 with the HEnc part written in details.




. By definition we have
AdvtdssHE,pm,pk (A, f) = Pr[G0 ⇒ true]− ωf (3)
Next, the gap between G0 and G1 can be reduced to DTE security. Note that the only
difference between G0 and G1 appears in line 2 and line 3. For any adversary A, consider
the following adversary D (in Fig 8) against DTE security: It is clear that D outputs 1 if
and only if A outputs the correct bit. Furthermore, D simulates G1 when S←$S, and D
simulates G0 when S is the DTE encoding of message M ←pmM. It follows that:





C̃ ← HR(K)⊕ S
C ← (R, C̃)
b←$A(C)
if b = f(M) return 1
else return 0
Figure 8 Adversary D(S) against DTE security games.
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Adversary A∗(C)
(R, C̃)← C
L0 ← 0, L1 ← 0
for K ∈ K do
S ← HR(K)⊕ C̃
M ← decode(S)




Figure 9 Adversary A∗(C) in game G2.
The next step is to show that G2 is equivalent to G1. Note that in G1 we first sample
S uniformly from S and independently from K, which guarantees C̃ also to be a uniform
sample from S independent from K. Therefore, we can first sample C̃ uniformly and choose
K after the execution of A, which is exactly the case in G2. Therefore,
Pr[G1 ⇒ true] = Pr[G2 ⇒ true] (5)
Now consider the following adversary A∗ in G2: Adversary A∗ adds up the probability
mass of all the keys resulting in f(M) = 0 and f(M) = 1 respectively; therefore, we have
L0 = Pr[f(M) = 0] and L1 = Pr[f(M) = 1]. This implies that A∗ is the best possible
adversary in game G2. If we denote Pr[G∗2 ⇒ true] to be the probability that A∗ succeeds in
G2, we have
Pr[G2 ⇒ true] ≤ Pr[G∗2 ⇒ true] (6)




exactly Lb∗ in adversary A∗, which is the probability that A∗ succeeds conditioned on the
choice of (R, C̃). Taking expectation over all (R, C̃) gives





Combining 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 gives the proof for Lemma 3. ◀
B Proof for Lemma 5 and Theorem 6









for some α ∈ (0, 1). Recall that LH,DTE,fpk = max{pk(B0), pk(B1)}, where
pk(B0), pk(B1) represents the probability that predicate f returns 0 or 1 respectively, under





= Pr[max{pk(B0), pk(B1)} ≥ α]
≤ Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] + Pr[pk(B1) ≥ α]
(8)
It turns out that we only need to bound Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] and Pr[pk(B1) ≥ α], where pk(B1) =∑
f(Mi)=1 pk(Ki) =
∑|K|
i=1 f(Mi)pk(Ki), pk(B0) = 1− pk(B1) =
∑|K|
i=1(1− f(Mi))pk(Ki). At
this point, the value of each pk(Ki) is fixed given pk, therefore we are only concerned with
the distributions of f(Mi).
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▶ Lemma 15. The random variables M1, · · · , M|K| are q-wise independent, and each Mi
has the same distribution pd.
Here the q-wise independence follows from the fact that HR(K1), · · · , HR(K|K|) are q-wise
independent (for randomly chosen R), and that each Mi is a function of HR(Ki). Each
Mi has distribution pd since C̃ is uniformly chosen from S and independent from R, and
therefore each Si is uniformly chosen from S.
Now let pt(b) = Pr[f(M) = b |M ←pdM ] and ωt = max{pt(0), pt(1)}. We can assume
without loss of generality that ωt = pt(1) ≥ pt(0). It follows that 1/2 ≤ ωt ≤ 1. In this
way, f(M1), · · · , f(M|K|) are q-wise independent random variables satisfying for every i,
Pr[f(Mi) = 1] = ωt, Pr[f(Mi) = 0] = 1− ωt.
We can apply Lemma 4 to prove the following proposition:
▶ Proposition 16. Let ωk = max1≤i≤|K| pk(Ki), and α = ωt + (qωkωt)1/2e1/6. For q ≤
ωte
−1/3/ωk,
Pr[pk(B1) ≥ α] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋, Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋
Proof. We first prove the proposition for pk(B1). Define Xi = f(Mi)pk(Ki)/ωk for 1 ≤
i ≤ |K|, X =
∑|K|
i=1 Xi and µ = E[X]. Since for each i, pk(Ki)/ωk is a constant value
independent of Mi, the random variables X1, X2, · · · , X|K| are q-wise independent satisfying
Pr[Xi = pk(Ki)/ωk] = ωt, Pr[Xi = 0] = 1− ωt for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |K|. Therefore


















i=1 Xiωk = ωkX.
We apply Lemma 4 on X by choosing δ = (q/µe−1/3)1/2 = (qωk/ωt)1/2e1/6 and assuming
that δ ≤ 1, which is equivalent to q ≤ ωte−1/3/ωk. One can check that α = (1+δ)ωt. Lemma
4 states that Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋. On the other hand,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] = Pr
[
X ≥ (1 + δ) ωt
ωk
]
= Pr[ωkX ≥ (1 + δ)ωt] = Pr[pk(B1) ≥ α]
Therefore Pr[pk(B1) ≥ α] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋. This proves the first part of the proposition.
The second part of the proof for pk(B0) comes in a similar fashion. This time we
redefine Xi = (1− f(Mi))pk(Ki)/ωk, X =
∑|K|
i=1 Xi and µ = E[X] = (1− ωt)/ωk. Note that
pk(B0) = ωkX. Consider both cases of Lemma 4:
1) If q ≤ µe−1/3 = (1 − ωt)e−1/3/ωk, we choose δ = (q/µe−1/3)1/2 ≤ 1, ensuring that
q = δ2µe−1/3. Conditions of the first inequality of Lemma 4 are satisfied since q is always
an integer. Therefore,
Pr[pk(B0) ≥ (1 + δ)µωk] = Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋
One can check that (1+δ)µωk = (1−ωt)+(qωk(1−ωt))1/2e1/6 ≤ ωt +(qωkωt)1/2e1/6 = α.
(inequality follows from 1/2 ≤ ωt ≤ 1) Thus
Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] ≤ Pr[pk(B0) ≥ (1 + δ)µωk] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋
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2) If q ≥ µe−1/3 = (1−ωt)e−1/3/ωk, we choose δ = q/µe−1/3 ≥ 1, ensuring that q = δµe−1/3.
Again, conditions of the second inequality of Lemma 4 are satisfied since q is an integer.
Therefore,
Pr[pk(B0) ≥ (1 + δ)µωk] = Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋
This time we have (1 + δ)µωk = (1−ωt) + qωke1/3 ≤ ωt + (qωkωt)1/2e1/6 = α. (inequality
follows from the assumption q ≤ ωte−1/3/ωk and 1/2 ≤ ωt ≤ 1) Thus
Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] ≤ Pr[pk(B0) ≥ (1 + δ)µωk] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋
Combining both cases, we conclude that for q ≤ ωte−1/3/ωk, Pr[pk(B0) ≥ α] ≤ e−⌊q/2⌋.
This ends the proof for the second part of the proposition. ◀


















≤ α + 2e−⌊q/2⌋(1− α)
= ωt + 2e−⌊q/2⌋(1− ωt) + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωkωt)1/2e1/6









≤ ωt + e−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6 (9)
This finishes the proof for Lemma 5.
From Lemma 3 and 9,







≤ AdvdteDTE,pm + ωt + e
−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6 − ωf
(10)
for all A, f and q ≤ e−1/3/2ωk.
Now consider the following adversary Df against the DTE security game: on input S,
Df decodes S, applies f to the decoded message and outputs the f -value obtained. One








= ωt. By the
definition of DTE advantage |ωf − ωt| ≤ AdvdteDTE,pm . This combining with inequality (10)
gives
AdvtdssHE,pm,pk (A, f) ≤ 2Adv
dte
DTE,pm + e
−⌊q/2⌋ + (1− 2e−⌊q/2⌋)(qωk)1/2e1/6 (11)
Notice that the right hand side of inequality (11) is independent of the choice of (A, f).
This finishes the proof of Theorem 6. ◀
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